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THE LAST SHOULD BE FIRST—FLIP THE ORDER
OF THE CHEVRON TWO-STEP
Richard Murphy*
One can almost see the Justices knocking their heads with the heels
of their hands, looking for the means to express their sense of the
proper allocation of decisionmaking authority [between agencies
and courts].1
So—so if you want to go into the Chevron Step Zero or Step Minus
Alpha 13.6, I mean, fine. [Laughter from the Supreme Court gallery]2
INTRODUCTION
The most recent Supreme Court term marked the appearance of yet another
major case on the applicability of the (in)famous Chevron doctrine, City of Arlington
v. FCC.3 The question presented was whether Chevron deference should apply to
an agency’s construction of its own jurisdiction.4 The very existence of this question
was a reminder of the embarrassing tendency of deference doctrine toward complexity.
It seems harder than it should be. Compounding the embarrassment, gathering empir-
ical evidence suggests that it may not matter too much whether the courts purport to
apply weak or strong forms of review of agency actions—courts affirm agency out-
comes at about the same rate either way.5
* AT&T Professor of Law, Texas Tech University School of Law. This Article was written
for a symposium held to honor the memory of the late Professor Charles Koch, a leading scholar
of administrative law for decades. Professor Koch’s career was an inspiring example of how a
great law professor can combine academic and professional engagement. He authored scholarly
works that deepen our understanding of the law; wrote many volumes of treatises that provide
clear and accurate guidance to the bench and bar; and developed an innovative, problem-driven
casebook for teaching Administrative Law—one of the most challenging courses of the law
school curriculum. I had the privilege of working with Professor Koch after he invited me to join
him and Professor William Jordan as a co-editor of the casebook. It was an honor to do so and
a terrific learning experience. Many thanks to the William & Mary Bill of Rights Journal and the
Institute for Bill of Rights Law for organizing an excellent event in Professor Koch’s honor.
1 Charles H. Koch, FCC v. WNCN Listeners Guild: An Old-Fashioned Remedy for What
Ails Current Judicial Review Law, 58 ADMIN. L. REV. 981, 993 (2006).
2 Transcript of Oral Argument at 6, City of Arlington v. FCC, 133 S. Ct. 1863 (2013)
(No. 11-1547), available at http://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts
/11-1545.pdf (recording comment by Justice Breyer). The laughter that followed Justice Breyer’s
remark proves that the Chevron doctrine is funny. Id.
3 133 S. Ct. 1863 (2013).
4 Id. at 1867–68.
5 See Richard J. Pierce, Jr., What Do the Studies of Judicial Review of Agency Actions
Mean?, 63 ADMIN. L. REV. 77, 85 (2011) (collecting studies on affirmance rates; observing,
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To many in the administrative law community, deference doctrine nonetheless
seems important. There is, of course, the never-ending supply of article fodder it
supplies.6 More creditably, there is a sense that it is important to think about deference
doctrine the right way because it expresses something fundamental about separation of
powers and the proper roles of courts and agencies. An ideal deference doctrine would
express this relation in a simple, compelling way. The Chevron doctrine has failed to
do so—even though rivers of academic and judicial ink have flowed on the subject.7
The late Professor Charles Koch pointed the way to a better, clearer Chevron
doctrine.8 As Charles saw it, this doctrine should not be regarded as an earthshaking
“counter-Marbury for the administrative state.”9 Rather, it is a clumsy application to
“[w]ith one notable exception, the studies suggest that a court’s choice of which doctrine to apply
in reviewing an agency action is not an important determinant of outcomes in the Supreme Court
or the circuit courts”); David Zaring, Reasonable Agencies, 96 VA. L. REV. 135, 174–75 (2010)
(collecting studies showing that agencies win in court about sixty to seventy percent of the time,
regardless of ostensible standard of review).
6 Cf. Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 1019
(2005) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (commenting that the Court’s decision on the relation of Chevron
to stare decisis created “a wonderful new world . . . full of promise for administrative-law profes-
sors in need of tenure articles.”). For a tenure article on this very issue published shortly before
Justice Scalia’s remark, see Richard W. Murphy, A “New” Counter-Marbury: Reconciling
Skidmore Deference and Agency Interpretive Freedom, 56 ADMIN. L. REV. 1 (2004) [hereinafter
Murphy, A “New” Counter-Marbury].
7 The literature is vast. For a sampling of recent works, see Kenneth A. Bamberger & Peter
L. Strauss, Chevron’s Two Steps, 95 VA. L. REV. 611 (2009); Jack M. Beermann, End the Failed
Chevron Experiment Now: How Chevron Has Failed and Why It Can and Should Be Overruled,
42 CONN. L. REV. 779 (2010); Evan J. Criddle, Chevron’s Consensus, 88 B.U. L. REV. 1271
(2008); Gary Lawson & Stephen Kam, Making Law Out of Nothing At All: The Origins of the
Chevron Doctrine, 65 ADMIN. L. REV. 1 (2013); Mark Seidenfeld, Chevron’s Foundation, 86
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 273 (2011) [hereinafter Seidenfeld, Chevron’s Foundation]; Matthew C.
Stephenson & Adrian Vermeule, Chevron Has Only One Step, 95 VA. L. REV. 597 (2009); Peter
L. Strauss, “Deference” Is Too Confusing—Let’s Call Them “Chevron Space” and “Skidmore
Weight,” 112 COLUM. L. REV. 1143 (2012) [hereinafter Strauss, “Deference” Is Too Confusing].
For a somewhat older but leading work on the puzzles created by Chevron, see especially
Thomas W. Merrill & Kristin E. Hickman, Chevron’s Domain, 89 GEO. L.J. 833, 836 (2001)
(identifying fourteen then-unanswered questions concerning the applicability and effect of the
Chevron doctrine).
8 Professor Koch would have denied this characterization and insisted that he only sought
to remind people of an approach long followed by the bench’s leading lights of administrative
law. See Koch, supra note 1, at 993 (observing that “judicial review law would gain substantial
clarity” were it to follow the lead of Judges McGowan, Leventhal, Tamm, and Bazelon of the
D.C. Circuit). But if something has been forgotten long enough, finding and reminding can
amount to much the same thing.
9 Cf., e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Law and Administration After Chevron, 90 COLUM. L. REV.
2071, 2075 (1990) (citation omitted) (“Chevron promises to be a pillar in administrative law for
many years to come. It has become a kind of Marbury, or counter-Marbury, for the administra-
tive state.” (citing Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803))).
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statutory construction of two old, familiar ideas in administrative law: Courts are in
charge of the law; agencies are in charge of policymaking within their respective
spheres of authority.10 Statutory construction of agency enabling acts lies at the con-
tested boundary between these two ideas. Our legal system’s default position is that
statutory construction presents issues of law that courts control—they are in charge of
“say[ing] what the law is.”11 Chevron recognized, however, that as agencies give oper-
ative meaning to vague statutes, they often must make subsidiary policy choices “to
fill . . . gap[s] left . . . by Congress.”12 Insofar as the process of statutory construction
depends on these agency policy choices, the principle of judicial deference to agency
policymaking should apply to it. Thus, an agency’s reasoned policy analysis provides
a good reason for courts to apply a deferential standard of review to an agency’s stat-
utory construction.
Suppose that one wished to characterize the preceding analysis as a logically or-
dered “two-step” that courts might generally apply when reviewing an agency’s con-
struction of a statute that it administers. It might run like this: First, has the agency
offered a reasoned justification explaining why its preferred statutory construction
would generate beneficial policy effects? If not, then Chevron deference, as such, does
not apply.13 If the agency has offered a reasonable policy explanation, then the review-
ing court should affirm the agency’s statutory construction so long as it is consistent
with a reasonable understanding of Congress’s instructions.14 Ordered this way, the
Chevron two-step would fit neatly into a simple model of the pragmatic pre-Chevron
regime for judicial deference. On this approach, a reviewing court first checks whether
there is some special reason to trust an agency’s judgment. If there is, then the court ap-
plies a deferential standard of review; if not, the court “says what the law is” by adopt-
ing the statutory construction it deems best.15
Those with a passing familiarity with administrative law know that the Chevron
doctrine, whatever its merits, is not known for its simplicity.16 They also know that the
two-step just described runs in the opposite order of the Supreme Court’s framework,
which inquires at its step one “whether Congress has directly spoken to the precise
10 Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 844 (1984) (charac-
terizing ambiguity in an agency statute as an implicit delegation of policymaking authority).
11 Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 177.
12 Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843.
13 Other grounds for deference might apply, however. See infra Part I.B (discussing
long-standing judicial practice of extending strong deference to long-standing agency statu-
tory constructions).
14 Cf. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843 n.9 (instructing courts to use the “traditional tools of statutory
construction” to determine clear statutory meaning).
15 See generally infra Part I.B.
16 See generally, e.g., Elizabeth V. Foote, Statutory Interpretation or Public Administration:
How Chevron Misconceives the Function of Agencies and Why It Matters, 59 ADMIN. L. REV.
673 (2007).
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question at issue”17 and waits until step two to assess whether an agency had a rea-
soned explanation for its choice.18 Thus, a deference doctrine rooted in respect for
agency policymaking purports to end with review of agency explanations rather than
start with them.
This odd ordering has contributed to Chevron confusion, unmooring the doctrine
from its core insight that courts handle law and agencies handle policy. More particu-
larly, it has spurred development of Chevron’s “step zero,” which asks needlessly con-
fusing questions regarding the eligibility of agency statutory constructions for Chevron
deference.19 It also encourages courts to engage in potentially counter-productive inqui-
ries at step one as to whether a statute leaves room for deference before asking whether
the agency has done anything to deserve it.20
There is a straightforward way to eliminate this confusion, make the Chevron doc-
trine easy, and fit it neatly into preexisting deference doctrine: reverse the order of the
steps.21 The best justification for Chevron deference is agency policymaking compe-
tence,22 so a court reviewing a plausible agency statutory construction should first
inquire if the agency has in fact deployed that competence. If it has, then Chevron’s
strong deference is in order, and the court should affirm if the agency’s statutory con-
struction is reasonable. Chevron really should be that simple.
A roadmap: To embed Chevron in its larger milieu, Part I will briefly highlight cer-
tain aspects of pre-Chevron deference doctrine.23 Part II will discuss Chevron itself as
17 Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842.
18 Id. at 843; see also Judulang v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 476, 483 n.7 (2011) (noting that
Chevron step two is just a name for arbitrary-and-capricious review as applied to statutory
construction); Chevron, 467 U.S. at 864–66 (canvassing policy arguments in favor of the EPA’s
statutory construction near the end of the Chevron opinion). For early discussions of the role
of policy review at step two, see Ronald M. Levin, The Anatomy of Chevron: Step Two Re-
considered, 72 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1253 (1997); Mark Seidenfeld, A Syncopated Chevron:
Emphasizing Reasoned Decisionmaking in Reviewing Agency Interpretations of Statutes, 73
TEX. L. REV. 83 (1994) [hereinafter Seidenfeld, A Syncopated Chevron].
19 See infra Part II.B.1. For an insightful essay exploring the relation between Chevron’s step
two and its unfortunate step zero, see especially William S. Jordan, III, Judicial Review of
Informal Statutory Interpretations: The Answer Is Chevron Step Two, Not Christensen or Mead,
54 ADMIN. L. REV. 719, 727–30 (2002) (contending that treating step two as a form of hard-look
review would eliminate the need for confusing step-zero inquiries regarding which types of
agency informal statutory interpretations warrant strong deference).
20 See infra Part II.B.2.
21 For an example of a Supreme Court opinion that essentially reversed the Chevron two-
step, see Zuni Pub. Sch. Dist. No. 89 v. Dep’t of Educ., 550 U.S. 81, 90–100 (2007) (assessing
agency policy justifications before turning to the statute’s “literal language”). Six concurring and
dissenting Justices joined opinions disapproving this move. Id. at 107 (Kennedy, J., concurring)
(expressing concern that reversing the two-step would give too much weight to agency policy
concerns at the expense of traditional tools of statutory construction); id. at 108–09 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) (describing the lead opinion’s structure as “a most suspicious order of proceeding”);
see infra Part III.B (discussing Zuni at more length).
22 Chevron, 467 U.S. at 844–45.
23 See infra Part I.
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well as some of the more notable “step-zero” cases that try to set boundaries around the
doctrine’s applicability.24 Part III will argue that a reversed two-step would eliminate
much of the confusion associated with the Chevron doctrine’s current form while
retaining basic virtues of respect for agency expertise and adaptability to changing
circumstances.25 And the Conclusion, naturally, provides some final thoughts.
I. PRE-CHEVRON DEFERENCE TO AGENCY STATUTORY CONSTRUCTIONS
AND APPLICATIONS
Notwithstanding any Marbury power to “say what the law is,”26 American courts
have frequently declared over the past couple of hundred years that they should give
special weight to agency statutory constructions.27 Courts based deference not on some
overarching theory, but on an “eclectic cluster of considerations” that they applied flex-
ibly and pragmatically—or sometimes ignored.28
For the present purpose, two important themes pop out of the cases. First, courts
should, as common sense and good manners would seem to demand, pay careful atten-
tion to agencies’ explanations for their statutory constructions.29 Second, some recurring
circumstances justify a stronger form of deference that requires affirmance of an
agency’s statutory construction so long as it is reasonable. One of the most frequently
offered justifications for this strong form of deference was that an agency’s interpreta-
tion was “longstanding.”30
A. Skidmore’s Duty of Attention as “Deference” (or “Respect” or “Weight”)
It should seem obvious that a court, when determining how to construe a statute
that an agency administers, should pay careful attention to the agency’s explanation
for its own construction. Indeed, this duty may seem so self-evident that it hardly re-
quires a legal doctrine all its own to support it.31 Nonetheless, this requirement has
24 See infra Part II.
25 See infra Part III.
26 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803).
27 See infra note 49 and accompanying text.
28 See Colin S. Diver, Statutory Interpretation in the Administrative State, 133 U. PA. L. REV.
549, 562 n.95 (1985) (providing a “partial list” of factors justifying deference, including, inter
alia: whether the agency interpretation was long-standing; whether it was generated contempora-
neously with the statute subject to interpretation; whether the agency’s interpretation was con-
sistent over time; whether the interpretation had generated reliance interests; whether the
interpretation implicated agency expertise, etc.); Thomas W. Merrill, Judicial Deference to
Executive Precedent, 101 YALE L.J. 969, 972, 972–75 (1992) (describing the flexible, pragmatic
approach to judicial review of the pre-Chevron era).
29 Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944).
30 See infra note 49 (collecting a sample of cases).
31 See, e.g., United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 250 (2001) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(“Justice Jackson’s eloquence notwithstanding, the rule of Skidmore deference is an empty
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come to be called “Skidmore deference” after the case with which it is most closely
associated, Skidmore v. Swift & Co.32 In essence, Skidmore tells courts to pay atten-
tion to agency statutory constructions but to follow them only to the degree they are
persuasive.33 As this approach instructs courts to adopt statutory constructions that
the courts, rather than agencies, deem best, it is fair to argue that Skidmore does not
really require “deference” as such at all.34 Some therefore prefer the phrase “Skidmore
respect” or “Skidmore weight.”35
In Skidmore, employees of Swift & Co. claimed entitlement to overtime pay under
the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) for time they spent at the worksite on call to re-
spond to fire alarms and the like.36 They were largely free to spend their time as they
wished, sleeping, eating, playing games, etc.37 The Supreme Court explained that “no
principle of law found either in the statute or in Court decisions preclude[d] waiting
time from also being working time.”38 Rather, whether wait time was work time in a
given case depended on application of the statute to the particular facts.39 In some statu-
tory schemes, Congress commits adjudication of such “mixed questions of law and
fact” to agencies, and courts are supposed to affirm the results so long as they are
reasonable.40 Congress had committed resolution of FLSA claims, however, to the dis-
trict courts, so there was no agency finding regarding whether the Skidmore plaintiffs’
wait time was work time that a court might treat as “binding.”41
The FLSA had, however, created the Office of Administrator and given that official
power to investigate work conditions and bring public actions seeking injunctive
relief.42 In pursuance of these duties, the Administrator had issued an interpretive
truism and a trifling statement of the obvious: A judge should take into account the well-
considered views of expert observers.”).
32 Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 134.
33 Id. at 140 (referring to factors that give an agency explanation the “power to persuade” if
not “control”).
34 Id.
35 See, e.g., Price v. Stevedoring Servs. of Am., Inc., 697 F.3d 820, 832 (9th Cir. 2012) (en
banc) (referring to “Skidmore respect”); see also Strauss, “Deference” Is Too Confusing, supra
note 7, at 1145 (persuasively arguing that use of the slippery term “deference” in the context
of judicial review doctrine does far more harm than good).
36 Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 135–36.
37 Id. at 136.
38 Id.
39 Id. at 136–37 (“We have not attempted to, and we cannot, lay down a legal formula to re-
solve cases so varied in their facts as are the many situations in which employment involves
waiting time. Whether in a concrete case such time falls within or without the Act is a question
of fact to be resolved by appropriate findings of the trial court.”).
40 The most famous example of this approach to mixed questions is NLRB v. Hearst Pubs.,
Inc., 322 U.S. 111, 131 (1944) (stating that the National Labor Relations Board’s resolution of
mixed question of whether “newsboys” were “employees” was to be upheld if it had “warrant
in the record and a reasonable basis in law” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
41 Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 138–40.
42 Id. at 137.
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bulletin and informal rulings explaining his views on how to determine when periods
of inactivity should count as work time.43 Although these views did not bind the courts,
they were entitled to “respect” as the product of “specialized experience” gained in pur-
suit of official duties.44 Justice Jackson explained:
We consider that the rulings, interpretations and opinions of the
Administrator under this Act, while not controlling upon the courts
by reason of their authority, do constitute a body of experience and
informed judgment to which courts and litigants may properly re-
sort for guidance. The weight of such a judgment in a particular
case will depend upon the thoroughness evident in its consider-
ation, the validity of its reasoning, its consistency with earlier and
later pronouncements, and all those factors which give it power to
persuade, if lacking power to control.45
Thus, a court must pay attention to an agency’s views regarding statutory construc-
tion and application, but the court should only follow these agency views to the extent
they are persuasive.46 Whether the agency’s views are persuasive, of course, depends
on the good judgment of the court.47
B. Circumstances Justifying Strong Deference (a.k.a. Rationality Review)
Skidmore expresses a baseline that courts, although they owe respect to agencies’
well-reasoned views, should ultimately choose statutory constructions that the courts,
not agencies, deem best. Many judicial opinions issued over the last two centuries, how-
ever, have identified factors justifying stronger deference that checks not whether
agency statutory constructions are correct, but whether they are reasonable.48 Of
particular note, many cases emphasize the importance of deferring to long-standing
agency statutory constructions, especially if they have been consistent over time or
were adopted near the time Congress enacted the statute at issue.49
43 Id. at 138.
44 Id. at 139–40.
45 Id. at 140.
46 Id.
47 For acid commentary by Skidmore’s mortal foe, see United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S.
218, 241 (2001) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (characterizing Skidmore as an expression of “that test
most beloved by a court unwilling to be held to rules (and most feared by litigants who want to
know what to expect): th’ol’ ‘totality of the circumstances’ test”).
48 See, e.g., Diver, supra note 28 (identifying pre-Chevron factors justifying rational-
ity review).
49 See, e.g., NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 267, 274–75 (1974) (noting “a court may
accord great weight to the longstanding [agency] interpretation”); Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC,
395 U.S. 367, 381 (1969) (“[The] venerable principle that the construction of a statute by those
charged with its execution should be followed unless there are compelling indications that it
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One of the earliest statements by a federal court of the idea that long-standing, con-
sistent agency statutory constructions deserve strong deference came in 1810 in United
States v. Vowell.50 A ship carrying a cargo of salt arrived in the “district” of Alexandria
on December 23, 1807.51 Taking its time, the ship did not sail the last few miles to the
port of entry within the district until January 1, 1808.52 There was a good reason for this
delay—a statutory duty on imported salt lapsed on December 31, 1807.53 The gov-
ernment contended that Vowell had not avoided this tax because arrival in the district
triggered the duty;54 Vowell countered that arrival at the port of entry was the trigger-
ing event.55
In a paragraph-long opinion, Chief Justice Marshall made short work of rejecting
the government’s stance.56 He added that “[i]f the question had been doubtful,” he
would have followed the “uniform construction” of the Treasury Department on “simi-
lar questions.”57 This agency had consistently taken the view that, to beat the effective
date of a statutory increase in duties, ships had to arrive at a port of entry rather than the
geographic district containing that port.58 The Court admonished that this long-standing
construction applicable to increases should also apply to decreases.59
is wrong.”); Norwegian Nitrogen Prods. Co. v. United States, 288 U.S. 294, 315 (1933) (ceding
“peculiar weight” to “a contemporaneous construction of a statute by the men charged with the
responsibility of setting its machinery in motion”); Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co. v. United
States, 282 U.S. 740, 757 (1931) (“[I]n the interpretation of a doubtful or ambiguous statute the
long continued and uniform practice of the authorities charged with its administration is entitled
to great weight and will not be disturbed except for cogent reasons.”); United States v. Mo. Pac.
R.R. Co., 278 U.S. 269, 280 (1929) (“It has been held in many cases that a definitely settled ad-
ministrative construction is entitled to the highest respect . . . .”); Nat’l Lead Co. v. United States,
252 U.S. 140, 145–46 (1920) (“[G]reat weight will be given to the contemporaneous construction
by department officials . . . especially where such construction has been long continued . . . .”);
United States v. Finnell, 185 U.S. 236, 244 (1902) (Brown, J., dissenting) (stating that, in case
of “doubt,” the long-standing interpretation of “the department charged with the execution of the
statute should be respected, and not overruled except for cogent reasons”); Edwards’ Lessee v.
Darby, 12 U.S. (1 Wheat) 206, 210 (1827) (holding where construing an ambiguous law, “the
contemporaneous construction of those who were called upon to act under the law, and were ap-
pointed to carry its provisions into effect, is entitled to very great respect”); see also Richard W.
Murphy, Judicial Deference, Agency Commitment, and Force of Law, 66 OHIO ST. L.J. 1013,
1063–66 (2005) [hereinafter Murphy, Judicial Deference] (arguing for a “commitment” theory
that justifies deference to long-standing agency statutory constructions).
50 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 368 (1810).
51 Id. at 368.
52 Id.
53 Id. at 369.
54 Id.
55 Id. at 370.
56 Id. at 372.
57 Id.
58 Id.
59 Id.
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Vowell is a tempting example because it is so old, Chief Justice Marshall wrote it,
and the facts border on the colorful. Two factors weaken it as a precedent, however.
First, Chief Justice Marshall made plain that he rejected on the merits the government’s
new position on decreases regardless of whether the government’s old stance on in-
creases warranted weight.60 His observations on deference were dicta. Second, the
government’s inconsistent positions on statutory increases and decreases had a heads-
the-government-wins-tails-the-importer-loses quality that the Court disliked.61
Let us therefore examine one more example from the many available. The 1914
case of Logan v. Davis62 turned on construction of an 1887 act that “adjusted” grants
of lands to railroads—i.e., took back land that had been improperly granted.63 These
adjustments raised the problem of what to do about lands that the railroads were sup-
posed to give back to the government but had already transferred to someone else.64 To
address this problem, Congress included a provision at section 4 of the 1887 act to pro-
tect good faith purchasers,65 such as Logan claimed to be.66 The dispositive issue was
whether this protection extended to purchases made after the 1887 act was passed. On
this point, the Court declared:
Whether § 4 was confined to purchases made prior to the date of
the act, or equally included subsequent purchases, where made in
good faith, is one of the controverted questions in the case. Both
views have support in the terms of the act, and if the question were
altogether new there would be room for a reasonable difference of
opinion as to what was intended. Certainly, resort to interpretation
would be necessary. But the question is not altogether new. It has
often arisen in the administration of the act, and successive Secre-
taries of the Interior uniformly have held that the remedial sections
embraced purchases after the date of the act, no less than prior pur-
chases, if made in good faith. . . . Many thousands of acres have
been patented to individuals under that interpretation, and to dis-
turb it now would be productive of serious and harmful results.
The situation therefore calls for the application of the settled rule
that the practical interpretation of an ambiguous or uncertain statute
by the Executive Department charged with its administration is
60 See id.
61 Id.
62 233 U.S. 613 (1914).
63 Id. at 614 (construing Adjustment Act of Mar. 3, 1887, ch. 376, 24 Stat. 556 (codified as
amended at 43 U.S.C. §§ 894–899 (2006))).
64 See id.
65 Adjustment Act of 1887, ch. 376 § 4, 43 U.S.C. § 897 (2006) (providing for the adjustment
of land grants made by Congress to aid in the construction of railroads).
66 Logan, 233 U.S. at 619.
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entitled to the highest respect, and, if acted upon for a number of
years, will not be disturbed except for very cogent reasons.67
The Court thus declined to determine the best meaning of section 4. It did not need
to do so—it was enough to determine that the Secretary’s construction was long-stand-
ing, uniform, and reasonable.68 Abandoning this agency construction would disturb reli-
ance interests and cause “serious and harmful results.”69 It was therefore proper to apply
the “settled rule” of following long-standing agency statutory constructions.70
Courts offered a mix of epistemic and instrumental reasons for extending strong
deference to consistent, long-standing agency statutory constructions. For instance,
courts sometimes explained that agencies, thanks to their expertise or involvement
in statutory drafting, had special insights into congressional purposes embedded in
statutes.71 Instrumental justifications often implicated broad “good government” policies
not tied to the specifics of any given statutory scheme. As Logan stressed, deferring to
long-standing agency statutory constructions enhances legal stability, consistency, and
reliance interests.72 Moreover, deference minimizes the possibility that a generalist
court might impose a statutory construction that needlessly interferes with an agency’s
ability to implement congressional policy effectively and efficiently. In sum, courts
recognized that strong deference is sometimes proper because: (1) agencies sometimes
know better than courts what Congress meant to achieve in a particular statute; and
(2) respecting agency statutory constructions furthers values such as legal consistency,
respect for reliance interests, and effective, efficient administration.
II. CHEVRON AND SOME AFTERMATH
The deference doctrines discussed above spelled at least a little trouble for the
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) in Chevron, which turned on a challenge to
the agency’s third construction in four years of the phrase “stationary source” in the
Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977.73 This inconsistency obviously meant that the
67 Id. at 626–27 (citing Kindred v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 225 U.S. 582, 596 (1912); United
States v. Ala. Great S. R.R. Co., 142 U.S. 615, 621 (1892); Hastings & Dakota R.R. Co. v.
Whitney, 132 U.S. 357, 366 (1889); United States v. Moore, 95 U.S. 760, 763 (1877)) (pro-
viding support for deference to long-standing agency constructions).
68 Id.
69 Id. at 627.
70 Id.
71 See, e.g., Moore, 95 U.S. at 763 (observing that agency officials charged with implement-
ing a new statute were likely to be “able men” and “not unfrequently . . . draftsmen of the laws
they are afterwards called upon to interpret”).
72 See Logan, 233 U.S. at 626–27.
73 Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 853–59 (1984)
(detailing the EPA’s efforts between 1977 and 1981 to construe “stationary source”).
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challenged statutory construction was ineligible for deference as a long-standing
interpretation. Moreover, in Skidmore, Justice Jackson had mentioned agency consis-
tency as a factor indicating that a statutory construction was persuasive.74 Inconsistency,
in law as in life, would seem to suggest the contrary.
The EPA’s flip-flopping did not, however, alter the basic fact that the agency had
far more expertise than the courts on how to clean up the air. Chevron’s core insight is
that this statute-specific policy expertise, when deployed in a demonstrably reasonable
way, justifies strong judicial deference to an agency’s statutory construction—even if
the agency’s challenged construction is new or inconsistent with the agency’s earlier
views.75 The Chevron doctrine’s flowering into a complex, confusing body of law is
due in no small part to its failure to focus tightly on this simple, compelling insight.
A. A Quick Chevron Stop
Time for the inevitable Chevron discussion: The Clean Air Act Amendments of
1977 required “nonattainment” states to impose a burdensome permitting process on
“new or modified major stationary sources of air pollution.”76 This obligation concen-
trated attention on the meaning of “stationary source.” More particularly, it raised the
question of how to apply this statutory phrase to plants containing more than one
pollution-emitting device.77 One might take the view that each device was its own
“stationary source.”78 Alternatively, one might treat the entire plant as one “stationary
source,” encasing all of its devices in one regulatory “bubble.”79
The EPA’s views on this point varied over time and changing administrations. In
1979, the agency declared that a plant-wide definition could be applied pursuant to re-
vised state implementation plans (SIPs) that satisfied various requirements, including
making “reasonable further progress” on satisfying limits on air pollution.80 In 1980, the
agency changed course, adopting a “dual definition” under which both a plant and its
components counted as “stationary sources.”81 In this approach, a change in a compo-
nent that generated a significant increase in emissions would be subject to permitting
even if other changes in the plant (under the “bubble”) would create offsetting reduc-
tions.82 The agency based this new stance in large part on two decisions by the D.C.
74 Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944).
75 Cf. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 863–64 (“An initial agency interpretation is not instantly carved
in stone. On the contrary, the agency, to engage in informed rulemaking, must consider varying
interpretations and the wisdom of its policy on a continuing basis.”).
76 Id. at 839–40 (citing Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977, § 172(b)(6), 42 U.S.C.
§ 7502(b)(6) (2006)).
77 Id. at 840.
78 Id. at 859.
79 Id.
80 Id. at 854–55.
81 Id. at 857.
82 Id.
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Circuit Court of Appeals holding that the bubble concept should not apply to programs
designed to reduce air pollution.83
In 1981, after the Reagan administration swept into office on a deregulatory
agenda, the EPA changed course again and adopted a rule that allowed SIPs to apply
the “bubble concept” and treat entire plants, rather than individual components, as
“stationary sources.”84 This approach would allow a firm to avoid permitting for modi-
fications that increased emissions from one component in a plant so long as the firm
found offsetting decreases from other components under the bubble. The EPA ex-
plained that this change was justified because it would encourage modernization of
plant components with newer, cleaner processes.85 Also, the change helped simplify ad-
ministration and eliminate confusion by ensuring that the agency applied just one defi-
nition of “source” across various programs designed to prevent or reduce air pollution.86
The EPA added that the change would not interfere with efforts to achieve compliance
with air pollution limits set by national ambient air quality standards.87
Environmentalists successfully challenged the new rule before the D.C. Circuit.88
The court conceded that Congress had not offered an explicit definition of “stationary
source” and that the legislative history was scant and “contradictory.”89 Nonetheless,
application of the bubble concept in nonattainment areas was illegal because it violated
the Clean Air Act’s policy of improving air quality as determined by two earlier D.C.
Circuit opinions.90
One might be forgiven for thinking that the D.C. Circuit had merely carried out its
Marbury job to “say what the law is.”91 The Supreme Court nonetheless reversed, de-
claring that the D.C. Circuit had made a “basic legal error” by “adopt[ing] a static judi-
cial definition of the term ‘stationary source’ when it had decided that Congress itself
had not commanded that definition.”92 When Congress delegates to an agency the task
of implementing a statute, it also implicitly delegates to the agency the task of resolving
ambiguities in that statute.93 Thus, it was up to the EPA, not the D.C. Circuit, to choose
among reasonable constructions of “stationary source.”
83 Id. at 857 n.29 (citing Ala. Power Co. v. Costle, 636 F.2d 323 (D.C. Cir. 1979); ASARCO,
Inc. v. EPA, 578 F.2d 319 (D.C. Cir. 1978)).
84 Id. at 857–58.
85 Id. at 858 (citing Requirements for Preparation, Adoption, and Submittal of Information
Plans; Approval and Promulgation of Implementation Plans, 46 Fed. Reg. 16,280–01 (proposed
Mar. 12, 1981)).
86 Id.
87 Id.
88 Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. Gorsuch, 685 F.2d 718 (D.C. Cir. 1982), rev’d sub nom.
Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
89 Id. at 723, 726 n.39.
90 Id. at 720, 726–27 (relying on the Alabama Power–ASARCO test the court pulled from
Alabama Power Co. v. Costle, 636 F.2d 323 (D.C. Cir. 1979), and ASARCO, Inc. v. EPA, 578
F.2d 319 (D.C. Cir. 1978)).
91 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803).
92 Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842.
93 Id. at 844.
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To give effect to this allocation of power, the Court instructed lower courts review-
ing an agency’s construction of a statute it administers to follow what has come to be
called the “Chevron two-step”:
First [step one], always, is the question whether Congress has di-
rectly spoken to the precise question at issue. If the intent of Con-
gress is clear, that is the end of the matter; for the court, as well as
the agency, must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent
of Congress. If, however, the court determines Congress has not
directly addressed the precise question at issue, the court does not
simply impose its own construction on the statute, as would be nec-
essary in the absence of an administrative interpretation. Rather
[step two], if the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the
specific issue, the question for the court is whether the agency’s
answer is based on a permissible construction of the statute.94
Applying this framework, the Court determined at step one that neither the Clean
Air Act Amendments of 1977 nor related statutes indicated that Congress had formed
any intent regarding the legality of the bubble concept.95 Legislative history was like-
wise unhelpful.96
Although it did not expressly say so, the Court treated step two’s inquiry into per-
missibility as a standard (if rather cursory) exercise in policy review.97 Review of a
discretionary policy decision for “reasoned decisionmaking” requires a court to check
whether an agency gave due consideration to the “relevant factors” that Congress ex-
pected the agency to assess; it also checks whether the agency avoided any “clear error
of judgment.”98 The Court observed that congressional policy concerns included both
promoting “reasonable economic growth” and environmental protection.99 The EPA
had considered both of these “relevant factors” in the course of adopting its “bubble
concept” approach to “stationary source.”100 Far from amounting to a clear error, this
decision represented a “reasonable accommodation of manifestly conflicting interests”
with support in the rulemaking record.101 Given the EPA’s careful, expert consider-
ation of a highly technical problem, the Court refused to second-guess the agency’s
policy judgment.102
94 Id. at 842–43 (citations omitted).
95 Id. at 861.
96 See id. at 862–64.
97 Id. at 864–66.
98 See Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43
(1983) (providing the canonical statement on review of agency policy judgments for rea-
soned decisionmaking).
99 Chevron, 467 U.S. at 863.
100 Id. at 863, 866.
101 Id. at 863–65.
102 Id. at 865.
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Stepping back, the Court’s analysis all flowed smoothly from its initial move de-
claring that agencies, not courts, should control resolution of ambiguities in agency
enabling acts. The Court offered, depending on how one counts, two or three justifica-
tions for this move. First, it stated that Congress had “implicitly delegated” authority
to agencies to resolve such ambiguities.103 Calling a delegation “implicit,” however,
is another way of saying that Congress itself said nothing about the matter.104 The
“implicit delegation” rationale is not really a statement about congressional intent.
Rather, it represents the Court’s conclusion about what a reasonable legislature should
want. And it turns out that reasonable legislatures want what reasonable courts, such
as the Supreme Court, want reasonable legislatures to want.
It is not difficult to fashion counter-arguments that a reasonable legislature should,
contra Chevron, want courts, rather than agencies, to resolve ambiguities in agency en-
abling acts. For instance, à la Marbury, tradition and history establish that determining
statutory meaning is a classic judicial function.105 This expectation is consistent with the
Administrative Procedure Act’s command to courts reviewing agency action to “decide
all relevant questions of law” and “interpret constitutional and statutory provisions of
law.”106 Therefore, Congress, absent express instructions to the contrary, would expect
courts to continue to carry out this task. Sounding a separation-of-powers theme, en-
trusting statutory construction to the courts minimizes the risk of agency overreaching.
Turning to rule-of-law values, judicial control enhances legal certainty and consistency
thanks to judicial adherence to stare decisis. The Supreme Court did not discuss such
possibilities in Chevron.
It did, however, buttress its case for deference to agencies with two more justifica-
tions—political accountability and agency expertise.107 The Court observed that agen-
cies are answerable to the political branches and that their policy choices therefore have
a greater claim to legitimacy than judicial ones.108 This justification arguably had special
salience at the time that Chevron was decided because President Reagan had explicitly
run on a deregulatory platform.109 It also may have particular bite as applied to “big
103 Id. at 844.
104 For a recent and thorough take-down of the implicit-congressional-intent justification for
Chevron, see especially Seidenfeld, Chevron’s Foundations, supra note 7, at 276–88.
105 See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803) (“It is emphatically the prov-
ince and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is.”).
106 Administrative Procedure Act § 706, 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2006).
107 Chevron, 467 U.S. at 865.
108 Id. at 865–66 (“While agencies are not directly accountable to the people, the Chief
Executive is, and it is entirely appropriate for this political branch of the Government to make
such policy choices—resolving the competing interests which Congress itself either inadvertently
did not resolve, or intentionally left to be resolved by the agency charged with the administration
of the statute in light of everyday realities.”).
109 See, e.g., Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 59
(1983) (Rehnquist, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“A change in administration
brought about by the people casting their votes is a perfectly reasonable basis for an executive
agency’s reappraisal of the costs and benefits of its programs and regulations.”).
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deal” rules sufficiently important and controversial to generate significant public atten-
tion. For most operations of the vast administrative state, however, this justification
might seem a makeweight. Very few people thumb through the Federal Register to de-
termine how to vote for President. Furthermore, political control of independent agen-
cies is, by design, attenuated. Still, agencies can lay a stronger claim for the electoral
legitimacy of the value choices that motivate their policies than life-tenured, un-
elected judges.
At the risk of indulging an editorial judgment, the best, most compelling rationale
for Chevron deference is agency expertise.110 Generally speaking, agencies, not courts,
are in a better position to understand the real-world implications of alternative construc-
tions of agency enabling acts. This point holds particular force for agencies acting in
highly specialized, technical fields, such as the EPA, the Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission (FERC), and the Department of Energy (DOE).111 A sensible court review-
ing an agency’s construction of a statute it administers will therefore give substantial
weight to the agency’s policy choices and justifications. Moreover, a sensible court
might expect a sensible legislature to expect this judicial deference. As such, that sen-
sible court might say that the sensible legislature “implicitly delegated” authority to the
agency to construe statutory ambiguities.
B. Some Post-Chevron Complexities
The Chevron doctrine has generated a baroque body of law—good business for
administrative law professors, as Justice Scalia has noted112—but maybe not for anyone
else. Two aspects of Chevron exacerbate the problem. First, the implicit delegation
110 Chevron, 467 U.S. at 865 (noting that “[j]udges are not experts in the field”); see, e.g.,
Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., Why Deference?: Implied Delegations, Agency Expertise, and the
Misplaced Legacy of Skidmore, 54 ADMIN. L. REV. 735, 754 (2002) (concluding that agency ex-
pertise provides the best rationale for judicial deference to agency statutory constructions). But
see Criddle, supra note 7, at 1275 (arguing that Chevron rests on multiple foundations rather
than a single correct one and observing that the Court applies Chevron deference only “where
agency decision-making processes satisfy five core factors: (1) congressionally delegated
authority, (2) agency expertise, (3) political responsiveness and accountability, (4) deliberative
rationality, and (5) national uniformity”).
111 For evidence that the Supreme Court is, in fact, more likely to affirm agency statutory
constructions that implicate significant technical expertise, see William N. Eskridge, Jr. &
Lauren E. Baer, The Continuum of Deference: Supreme Court Treatment of Agency Statutory
Interpretations from Chevron to Hamdan, 96 GEO. L.J. 1083, 1147 (2008) (“[C]omparative
institutional competence and intensity of the Court’s opinions are at least somewhat predictive
of agency win rates.”); Connor N. Raso & William N. Eskridge, Jr., Chevron as a Canon,
Not a Precedent: An Empirical Study of What Motivates Justices in Agency Deference Cases,
110 COLUM. L. REV. 1727, 1783 (2010) (“Justices were less apt to overturn policies issued
by agencies in highly and modestly technical areas.”).
112 Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 1019 (2005)
(Scalia, J., dissenting).
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justification invited focus on the specific contours of a non-existent congressional in-
tent, which is a little like arguing over the real color of unicorns. Second, although the
best justification for Chevron is respect for agency policymaking expertise, the Chevron
two-step reserves analysis of agency policymaking for step two.
1. The Problem of Step Zero
One of the drivers of the delegation problem is the sense, likely mistaken in part,
that Chevron deference is strong medicine.113 On this view, requiring courts to defer to
any reasonable agency statutory construction, à la Chevron, as opposed to leaving
courts in charge, à la Skidmore or maybe even Marbury, is a big deal. It might follow
that a sensible Congress would not want the courts to apply this strong medicine to any
old agency construction of a statute that the agency administers. Only worthy agency
statutory constructions need apply. This problem of determining the applicability of
Chevron deference is often called “step zero.”114
Over the last decade or so, the Supreme Court has issued a series of step-zero cases,
not all of which seem to agree with each other. Two especially notable members of this
group are United States v. Mead Corp.115 and Barnhart v. Walton.116 If these two cases
do not actually contradict each other, they certainly adopt very different approaches to
the problem.
Chevron addressed a very important social issue—the scope of permitting require-
ments under the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977.117 Mead, by contrast, addressed
whether three-ring day planners imported by Mead were “bound” “diaries” within the
meaning of the Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the United States and thus subject to
a four-percent tax.118 For some years, Customs took the view that the binders were not
“bound” “diaries” and thus not subject to the duty—a state of affairs that Mead rather
liked.119 In 1993, Customs realized that the day planners were “bound” “diaries” after
all and issued a Headquarters ruling letter to this effect.120 Mead sought review within
Customs, from the Court of International Trade, and before the Federal Circuit.121 The
Federal Circuit agreed with Mead, concluding that the day planners were not “diaries”
because they did not have enough writing space and were not “bound” because, if they
113 For evidence that Chevron is not so strong medicine, see supra note 5 and accompanying
text, citing to studies demonstrating that judicial affirmance rates do not vary much by defer-
ence doctrine.
114 Criddle, supra note 7, at 1299 (citing Cass R. Sunstein, Chevron Step Zero, 92 VA. L.
REV. 187, 224–26 (2006)).
115 533 U.S. 218 (2001).
116 535 U.S. 212 (2002).
117 Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 839–40 (1984).
118 Mead, 533 U.S. at 224.
119 Id. at 225.
120 Id.
121 Id. at 225–26.
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were, the category of “unbound” diaries would be empty.122 More to the present point,
the Federal Circuit also categorically held that the Customs ruling letters were not eligi-
ble for Chevron deference because they were adopted without public procedures, deter-
mined outcomes solely in individual cases, and lacked the “force of law.”123
The Supreme Court agreed with the Federal Circuit that Chevron deference was
inapplicable.124 The Court advised that Chevron applies only where “it appears [(1)] that
Congress delegated authority to the agency generally to make rules carrying the force
of law, and [(2)] that the agency interpretation claiming deference was promulgated in
the exercise of that authority.”125 This formulation of step zero was unfortunate in part
because the phrase “force of law” is one of the more confusing and pernicious terms in
the administrative law vocabulary.126 It also has two steps of its own,127 which leaves
Chevron with three or four steps, depending on how one counts.
Elaborating on step one of Mead, the Court declared that Congress can demonstrate
its intent to grant Chevron authority by expressly delegating power to an agency to en-
gage in “rulemaking or adjudication that produces regulations or rulings for which def-
erence is claimed.”128 An idea underlying this assertion is that Congress would expect
that agency actions subject to extensive and relatively transparent procedures, such as
notice-and-comment rulemaking or formal adjudication, should merit the force of
law.129 The Court added, however, that Congress might demonstrate its intent to
grant force-of-law power to an agency via “some other indication[s]” that the Court
left unspecified.130
Mead’s step two checks whether an agency actually invoked its force-of-law power
to imbue a statutory construction with Chevron’s protective deference.131 In many
cases, this will not be problematic—e.g., where an agency uses notice-and-comment
rulemaking to adopt a statutory construction. In Mead, however, Customs’ ruling letter
failed this invocation prong because, inter alia: (1) Customs expressly advises third par-
ties not to rely on ruling letters received by others; and (2) several dozen Customs
offices issue thousands of ruling letters per year with little or no procedure.132 As such,
122 Id. at 226.
123 Mead Corp. v. United States, 185 F.3d 1304, 1307 (Fed. Cir. 1999), overruled by 533
U.S. 218 (2001).
124 Mead, 533 U.S. at 227.
125 Id. at 226–27.
126 For discussion of the incoherence of “force of law” as deployed by Mead, see Richard W.
Murphy, Judicial Deference, Agency Commitment, and Force of Law, 66 OHIO ST. L.J. 1013,
1038–44 (2005).
127 Mead, 533 U.S. at 226–27.
128 Id. at 229.
129 Id. at 230 (“It is fair to assume generally that Congress contemplates administrative action
with the effect of law when it provides for a relatively formal administrative procedure tending
to foster the fairness and deliberation that should underlie a pronouncement of such force.”).
130 Id. at 227.
131 Id. at 226–27.
132 Id. at 218–19, 233.
448 WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL [Vol. 22:431
Customs’ ruling letters did not amount to a “legislative-type” activity that one would
expect to “bind more than the parties to the ruling.”133
Mead is a complex opinion that has generated substantial commentary and contro-
versy, and the preceding summary is incomplete. Still, it suggests a straightforward safe
harbor at step zero: Chevron deference should apply to agency statutory constructions
developed via notice-and-comment rulemaking or formal adjudication. Outside the safe
harbor, things can get tricky.
Barnhart v. Walton took a very different approach.134 In 1957, the Social Security
Administration adopted a definition of the statutory term “disability” in an opinion letter
issued without formal process.135 By the time of the Walton case, this opinion letter was
nearing fifty years of age, which would have entitled it to deference under plenty of pre-
Chevron precedent.136 The opinion letter did not, however, fall into a Mead safe harbor.
Perhaps to correct this defect, the agency embedded its construction of “disability” into
a rule adopted via notice-and-comment.137 A unanimous Court subsequently agreed that
Chevron deference applied.138
Writing for eight Justices, Justice Breyer seized an opportunity to move Chevron’s
step zero in the more nuanced direction he prefers.139 He explained that even without
the benefit of notice-and-comment, the agency’s statutory construction would still merit
Chevron deference:
[T]he Agency’s interpretation is one of long standing . . . . And the
fact that the Agency previously reached its interpretation through
means less formal than “notice and comment” rulemaking . . . does
not automatically deprive that interpretation of the judicial defer-
ence otherwise its due. . . .
In this case, the interstitial nature of the legal question, the re-
lated expertise of the Agency, the importance of the question to
administration of the statute, the complexity of that administration,
and the careful consideration the Agency has given the question
over a long period of time all indicate that Chevron provides the
133 Id. at 232.
134 535 U.S. 212 (2002).
135 Id. at 212, 219–20.
136 See id. at 220 (“And this Court will normally accord particular deference to an agency in-
terpretation of ‘longstanding’ duration.”). But see id. at 226 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and
concurring in the judgment) (condemning the notion that long-standing agency interpretations
warrant deference as an anachronistic “relic of the pre-Chevron days”).
137 Id. at 217, 221 (noting the possibility that the agency initiated rulemaking in response to
the litigation).
138 Id. at 212, 214, 217; id. at 227 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment).
139 See, e.g., Murphy, Judicial Deference, supra note 49, at 1037 (discussing Justice Breyer’s
more nuanced dissent in Christensen v. Harris County, 529 U.S. 576 (2000)).
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appropriate legal lens through which to view the legality of the
Agency interpretation here at issue.140
Put another way: Courts should approve of reasonable agency constructions that have
lasted a long time that address difficult, important questions with careful analysis.141
This stance is consistent with both Chevron itself and with pre-Chevron case law. Con-
ceptually, however, it does not square very easily with Mead’s hunt for proof that an
agency has been delegated and has invoked authority to imbue an interpretation with
the “force of law.”142
The Court’s most recent foray into the problem of Chevron’s domain came in City
of Arlington v. FCC.143 Justice Scalia opened the majority opinion by characterizing
the issue as “whether an agency’s interpretation of a statutory ambiguity that concerns
the scope of its regulatory authority (that is, its jurisdiction) is entitled to [Chevron]
deference.”144 This abstract issue was rooted in a tussle over FCC control over state
and local siting decisions for cell phone towers.145 The Telecommunications Act of
1996 incorporated limits on state and local control over such siting decisions into the
Communications Act.146 These are codified at 47 U.S.C. § 332(c)(7)(B). The Act ex-
pressly states that it imposes no other limits on state and local control.147 It also pro-
vides a judicial cause of action to contest claims that a state or locality has violated
these limits.148
One of these limits, codified at 42 U.S.C. § 332(c)(7)(B)(ii), is that state and local
governments must act on siting applications “within a reasonable period of time after
the request is duly filed.”149 This vague language naturally raises the question: What is
a “reasonable period of time”? The FCC has statutory authority to “prescribe such rules
and regulations as may be necessary in the public interest to carry out the provisions of
[the Communications Act].”150 Responding to complaints of delay by wireless service
providers, the FCC invoked this authority to issue a declaratory ruling setting presump-
tive time limits on siting applications.151 To justify this decision, the FCC observed
that “unreasonable delays . . . have obstructed the provision of wireless services” and
140 Barnhart, 535 U.S. at 221–22 (citations omitted).
141 See id.
142 See Murphy, Judicial Deference, supra note 49, at 1015, 1039 (discussing the role of the
question of whether Congress has given the agency the authority “to make rules carrying the
force of law”).
143 133 S. Ct. 1863 (2013).
144 Id. at 1866.
145 Id.
146 Id. (citing Rancho Palos Verdes v. Abrams, 544 U.S. 113, 115 (2005)).
147 Id. at 1866.
148 Id. at 1867.
149 42 U.S.C. § 332(c)(7)(B)(ii) (2006).
150 47 U.S.C. § 201(b) (2006).
151 In re Petition for Declaratory Ruling, 24 FCC Rcd. 13,994 (2009).
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“impede[d] the promotion of advanced services and competition that Congress deemed
critical in the Telecommunications Act of 1996.”152
The cities of Arlington and San Antonio challenged the declaratory ruling on a vari-
ety of grounds, all rejected by the Fifth Circuit.153 The Supreme Court granted a writ of
certiorari solely on the recurring question of whether Chevron deference applies to
agency assertions of “jurisdiction.”154 Much of the oral argument was spent trying to
figure out just what “jurisdiction” might mean in this context.155
Justice Scalia, ever the Chevron maximalist and author of the six to three majority
opinion, explained that this confusion was understandable because the distinction be-
tween jurisdictional and nonjurisdictional decisions at the agency level is a “mirage.”156
Any claim that an agency has exceeded its statutory authority can be characterized as
a “jurisdictional” question—or not.157 As the jurisdictional inquiry can add nothing but
confusion to review of agency action, federal judges should avoid it.158
The three-Justice dissent, led by Chief Justice Roberts, demonstrates the hold
that the “implicit delegation” theory of Chevron continues to have on judicial minds.159
According to the Chief Justice, the question of “jurisdiction” in this context boils down
to whether Congress wished an agency to enjoy Chevron authority to imbue its con-
struction of a particular statutory provision with the force of law.160 Courts should not
defer to an agency on this threshold question of whether Congress wanted courts to
defer to the agency.161 Understood in this sense, Chevron should not apply to “juris-
dictional” questions.
152 Id. at 14,006, 14,008.
153 City of Arlington v. FCC, 668 F.3d 229 (5th Cir. 2012), aff’d, 133 S. Ct. 1863 (2013).
154 City of Arlington v. FCC, 133 S. Ct. 1863, 1867–68 (2013); cf. Nathan Alexander
Sales & Jonathan H. Adler, The Rest Is Silence: Chevron Deference, Agency Jurisdiction,
and Statutory Silences, 2009 U. ILL. L. REV. 1497 (arguing that agencies should not, in gen-
eral, receive Chevron deference when interpreting their own jurisdiction).
155 See Transcript of Oral Argument at 4, 8–10, 29–32, City of Arlington v. FCC, 133 S. Ct.
1863 (2013) (No. 11-1545) (showing the parties argued this issue for over six pages); see also
City of Arlington, 133 S. Ct. at 1879 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (“The source of the confusion is
a familiar culprit: the concept of ‘jurisdiction,’ which we have repeatedly described as a word
with many, too many, meanings.” (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
156 See City of Arlington, 133 S. Ct. at 1868 (alluding to the confusing nature of the terms
“jurisdictional” and “non-jurisdictional”).
157 Id. at 1869–70.
158 See id. at 1871 (“The federal judge as haruspex, sifting the entrails of vast statutory
schemes to divine whether a particular agency interpretation qualifies as ‘jurisdictional,’ is not
engaged in reasoned decisionmaking.”).
159 Id. at 1880 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (“We give binding deference to permissible agency
interpretations of statutory ambiguities because Congress has delegated to the agency the author-
ity to interpret those ambiguities ‘with the force of law.’”).
160 Id. at 1879–80.
161 Id. at 1880 (“But before a court may grant such [Chevron] deference, it must on its own
decide whether Congress—the branch vested with lawmaking authority under the Constitution—
has in fact delegated to the agency lawmaking power over the ambiguity at issue.”).
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The majority’s refusal in City of Arlington to add further complications to step zero
by requiring a more fine-grained search for a fictional congressional intent was certainly
a positive development for judicial-deference doctrine. It did not, however, undo the
needless complexities generated by earlier cases, most notably Mead. As discussed
below, one way to eliminate these complexities is to dump the implicit delegation
fiction. Chevron deference is best justified by policy expertise; courts should check
whether an agency’s statutory construction deserves this type of deference by determin-
ing whether the agency has offered a reasonable, policy-based explanation for it.
2. Putting the Judicial Cart Before the Agency Horse at Step One
A moment’s reflection on the Chevron two-step might raise the question: Just what
is the point of step two? Step one determines if Congress has clearly precluded an
agency statutory construction. If the construction survives step one, it must fall within
the space in which reasonable minds might disagree. If step two merely checks whether
an agency statutory construction represents a reasonable outcome, then it has no work
to do after step one is done. One way around this conundrum is to think of step two as
checking whether the agency supported its statutory construction with reasoned deci-
sionmaking—i.e., in the course of making its policy commitments, has the agency con-
sidered the “relevant factors” and avoided any clear error of judgment.162 This view of
step two, in addition to giving it a reason for existing, has the virtue of tracking the
Supreme Court’s analysis in Chevron itself.163
It also, however, raises questions about the effects of step one, which advises courts
to deploy independently all “traditional tools of statutory construction.”164 These tools
include the statutory language directly at issue, related statutory language and context,
statutory purpose, policy analysis, canons of construction, etc.165 How a judge assesses
these materials depends both on the judge and the particulars of the case. Sometimes,
a quick read of the statute might be dispositive. This is another way of saying that some
cases are resolved by “plain meaning.” In less obvious cases, far more extensive review
of more varied materials may prove necessary. At some point in this process, the judge
will leap from consideration of the materials to a conclusion—e.g., that Congress
clearly precluded the agency’s statutory construction (or not). Put another way, in
tough, interesting cases, how a court assesses an agency’s statutory construction will
depend on the totality of the circumstances as filtered through the judge’s experiences,
training, and inclinations.
162 See Levin, supra note 18, at 1253–56 (analyzing the role of the second step of Chevron);
Seidenfeld, A Syncopated Chevron, supra note 18, at 83–84, 86–87 (asserting that agencies
should be required to explain why their interpretations are good policy).
163 See supra notes 76–79 and accompanying text (discussing Chevron’s review of the EPA’s
application of the bubble concept to “stationary source”).
164 Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843 n.9 (1984).
165 See id. at 862–66 (employing a number of these tools explicitly in its analysis).
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As the Chevron doctrine is currently framed, step one invites courts to leap to these
initial conclusions before fully focusing on the agency’s policy explanation. It is
strange that a doctrine rooted in deference to agency policy expertise encourages judges
to focus on agency explanations at the end, rather than the start, of their assessments.
One might think that, to the contrary, an expert agency’s policy analysis should inform
the court’s understanding and application of the other “traditional tools.”166 The notori-
ous stickiness of human judgments strengthens this point. People tend to discount new
evidence that runs counter to their previously held views.167 As such, if judges really do
conduct step one independently and without regard for agency policy explanations, it
is plausible that courts’ step-one judgments might taint their assessment of agency ex-
planations at step two.
III. REVERSE THE STEPS
There is a straightforward way to get rid of the Chevron maladies just discussed:
Reverse the order of the Chevron two-step. Asking the (current) step-two question of
whether the agency has a reasoned policy justification to support its preferred statutory
construction would eliminate the need for a Mead-style step zero. Doing so would also
allow agency policy concerns to appropriately inform courts’ assessment of all the other
“traditional tools of statutory construction” at (current) step one. An added bonus of
switching the order of the steps is that it would highlight the simple overall structure
of judicial deference to agency statutory constructions. Contrary to some appearances,
this doctrine is easy—or at least it should be easier.
A. Getting Rid of Step Zero
The key drivers of the judicial-deference doctrine should be institutional compe-
tence and authority. Regarding competence, courts are at least as capable as agencies
at the tasks of reading complex statutes, looking up words in dictionaries, applying
canons of construction, etc. Moreover, the courts’ role as neutral arbiters makes them
more trustworthy interpreters in some respects than agencies caught up in rulemaking
and enforcement. By contrast, agencies are generally supposed to be better than courts
at analyzing legislative facts and assessing the real-world consequences of alternative
166 Cf. Zuni Pub. Sch. Dist. No. 89 v. Dep’t of Educ., 550 U.S. 81, 90–100 (2007) (Breyer,
J., plurality) (flipping the order of the Chevron two-step so that agency policy views could inform
judicial determination of the range of permissible meanings technical statutory language could
bear). For further discussion of the Justices’ opinions in Zuni, see infra notes 195–218 and
accompanying text. See also Strauss, “Deference” Is Too Confusing, supra note 7, at 1165
(explaining that courts should apply Skidmore “weight,” which is itself a traditional tool of
statutory construction, at Chevron step one).
167 See, e.g., DANIEL KAHNEMAN, THINKING, FAST AND SLOW 80–81 (2011) (discussing
“confirmation bias”).
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agency actions. Agencies, in short, should be better at making policy choices within
their jurisdictions than courts. A deference doctrine based on these comparative advan-
tages might be very simple: Courts control the task of interpreting statutes to determine
congressional policy choices; agencies control the task of making their own subsidiary
policy choices as needed to implement congressional policy choices.168
In many situations, it is clear where institutional authority lies as between courts
and agencies. For instance, Congress often expressly delegates to an agency authority
to make legislative rules as reasonably necessary to implement its enabling act. Where
an agency invokes this delegated authority to create a new legislative obligation, it
is by hypothesis engaged in raw policymaking. Courts have neither the authority nor
the competence to second-guess the agency’s policy choice. This idea finds expres-
sion in judicial-review doctrine in the arbitrariness standard, which is supposed to be
highly deferential.169
The Chevron doctrine is befuddling in part because it deals with situations in which
authority and competency potentially pull in competing directions, and Congress has
not offered clear guidance. The background presumption that courts “say what the law
is,” embodied in Marbury and Skidmore, indicates that courts should construe agency-
enabling acts in the manner courts deem most persuasive.170 Agency expertise provides
a pragmatic reason for courts to weaken this presumption insofar as a statutory con-
struction depends on an agency’s subsidiary policy choices. Congress usually does not
resolve the tension between these impulses by expressly granting Chevron-style power
over statutory construction to agencies.171 It did not, for instance, declare in the Clean
Air Act Amendments of 1977 that courts should defer to any reasonable construction
of “stationary source” that the EPA might devise.172
Given this silence, the real ground for the Chevron doctrine is plainly not congres-
sional intent but rather the Supreme Court’s conclusion that the doctrine makes good
sense.173 The “implicit delegation” story is, in other words, just a characterization game.
168 Cf. Koch, supra note 1, at 983–84 (explaining that courts should control issues of law but
have neither the competence nor the authority to control policy).
169 See Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983)
(discussing the “arbitrary and capricious” standard of review).
170 See supra Part I.A (discussing Skidmore “deference”).
171 Sometimes, however, Congress does expressly grant such power. See, e.g., 29 U.S.C.
§ 213(a)(15) (2006) (exempting “babysitting” and certain “companionship services” from Fair
Labor Standards Act coverage, “as such terms are defined and delimited by regulations of the
Secretary”); cf. Long Island Care at Home, Ltd. v. Coke, 551 U.S. 158 (2007) (applying Chevron
deference to uphold a Department of Labor regulation construing this statutory provision). One
might, of course, think that the fact that Congress sometimes expressly delegates the equivalent
of Chevron authority undermines the argument for implicit delegations.
172 See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 851, 866
(1984) (upholding the EPA’s definition of “stationary source” although Congress was silent
on the issue).
173 Cf. Seidenfeld, Chevron’s Foundation, supra note 7, at 275 (rejecting the “implicit con-
gressional intent” justification for Chevron and describing it as a “self-imposed constraint” meant
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Such legal fictions are common and often harmless. This one, however, has transmuted
into step zero’s hunt for the precise contours of Congress’s implicit (i.e., fake) intent
regarding the scope of agencies’ Chevron-style power.174
The confusion that this hunt has caused serves no worthwhile purpose. If the core
rationale for the Chevron doctrine is agency policy competence, then it should follow
that the test for determining its applicability should be, quite simply: Has the agency of-
fered a reasonable policy basis for its preferred construction, thus demonstrating that
it deployed its policymaking competence?175 Courts have a well-established and def-
erential model for review of agency policy choices—review for reasoned decision-
making.176 This model also happens to be the same type of inquiry required by the
current Chevron step two, best understood.177
It follows that a court conducting a Chevron analysis should not start with a Mead-
style hunt for a fictional congressional intent but should instead start with (current)
Chevron step two, inquiring whether the agency supported its statutory construction
with a reasoned policy choice. If not, then Chevron deference, as such, is inapplicable.
If the agency’s policy rationale passes muster, then the reviewing court should ask the
(current) step-one question of whether Congress clearly precluded the agency’s statu-
tory construction. For ease of reference, let us call the reversed steps “step one*” and
“step two*.”
This reordered Chevron would fit neatly and simply into the structure of pre-
Chevron case law. The default Skidmore approach under the pre-Chevron regime is that
courts choose the statutory constructions they deem most persuasive.178 Special consid-
erations, most notably the long-standing status of a statutory construction, may justify
the strong deference of rationality review.179 Sensibly combining these points leads to
a system in which a court reviewing an agency statutory construction: (1) checks
whether special grounds, such as long-standing status, justify strong deference; and then
(2) applies the appropriate standard of review. A reordered Chevron fits this two-step
exactly, recognizing that a reasoned agency policy justification, like long-standing sta-
tus, is a justification for strong deference.
to block courts from reading their own policy preferences into statutes where “an appropriate
alternative institution also bears responsibility for interpreting the statute”).
174 See generally infra Part II.B (discussing several notable step-zero cases).
175 Cf. Jordan, supra note 19, at 727–30 (arguing that a meaningful step two based on hard-
look review eliminates many of the concerns addressed by Mead-style step-zero inquiries);
Krotoszynski, supra note 110, at 737 (“Whether Chevron deference applies in a given case
should not turn on the legal fiction of an implied delegation of lawmaking power, but rather on
whether the materials at issue reflect and incorporate agency expertise.”).
176 See Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43
(1983) (providing the canonical statement on review of agency policy judgments for rea-
soned decisionmaking).
177 See supra note 18 (citing authorities for the equivalence of Chevron step two and arbi-
trariness review).
178 See supra Part I.A (discussing Skidmore).
179 See supra Part I.B.
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Consider how application of a reordered two-step might apply to Chevron itself.
No step-zero inquiry into fictional congressional intent would be required. The Court
would instead start its analysis by examining the EPA’s policy explanation for prefer-
ring its “bubble concept” approach to “stationary source.”180 The EPA explained that
this approach would foster economically efficient changes without impeding timely
attainment of pollution goals and would simplify administration.181 In the real case,
the Court concluded (in so many words) that this policy justification survived review
for reasoned decisionmaking.182 It should therefore survive step one* of the reor-
dered Chevron.
At step two*, the Court would, given the outcome of step one*, need to accept that
the EPA’s statutory construction would generate beneficial policy effects—i.e., the
“traditional tool” of interstitial policy analysis favors the EPA. Given this much, the
Court would assess whether any other pertinent “traditional tools” nonetheless indicated
that Congress clearly wished to preclude the agency’s choice. Nothing in the Clean Air
Act Amendments of 1977, related statutes, or legislative history is plainly inconsis-
tent with the EPA’s “bubble concept” approach to “stationary source.”183 Therefore,
it should survive step two*.
The 2006 case of Gonzales v. Oregon,184 by contrast, provides a nice example of
how an agency might fail to obtain deference from a reordered Chevron. In this case,
the state of Oregon challenged an interpretive rule issued by Attorney General Ashcroft
that determined that “[a]ssisting suicide is not a ‘legitimate medical purpose’ within the
meaning of [the Controlled Substances Act (CSA).]”185 This conclusion had the effect
of criminalizing physician efforts to assist suicide in compliance with the Oregon Death
with Dignity Act (ODWDA).186 The majority avoided applying Chevron deference by
narrowly construing the Attorney General’s rulemaking authority to exclude efforts to
define the scope of medical practice—a move in tension with the tendency in other con-
texts to define grants of rulemaking power broadly.187
A reordered two-step would likewise deny Chevron deference, but for the more di-
rect reason that the Attorney General did not offer a policy-based rationale that could
180 Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 858 (1984).
181 Id.
182 Id. at 863–65 (describing the EPA’s bubble-concept approach to “stationary source” as “a
reasonable accommodation of manifestly competing interests”).
183 Id. at 859–64.
184 546 U.S. 243 (2006).
185 Id. at 254 (quoting Dispensing of Controlled Substances to Assist Suicide, 66 Fed.
Reg. 56,607, 56,608 (Nov. 9, 2001) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 1306) (internal quotation
marks omitted)).
186 Id.
187 Id. at 258 (concluding that the Attorney General, although he has rulemaking authority
under the CSA, “is not authorized to make a rule declaring illegitimate a medical standard for
care and treatment of patients that is specifically authorized under state law”); cf. id. at 294
(Scalia, J., dissenting) (describing the majority’s effort to use explicit delegation provisions in
the CSA to cabin the Attorney General’s authority as “at best, a fossil of our pre-Chevron era”).
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survive deferential review for reasoned decisionmaking. The interpretive rule’s jus-
tifications were set forth in a memorandum authored by the Office of Legal Counsel
(OLC).188 As one would expect from a memo generated by the lawyers of the OLC,
much of the discussion is devoted to review of authority, notably including Supreme
Court case law, but also including the views of medical associations such as the Ameri-
can Medical Association.189
The memo’s “policy” analysis is scant. It does mention the valid concern that
physician-assisted suicide might lead to coerced deaths, especially among vulnerable
populations such as the poor and disabled.190 Certainly, this point was a “relevant
factor” appropriate for analysis. The memo does not, however, assess other obvious
points of discussion, such as the suffering that the ODWDA was designed to alleviate,
or its protections against coercion. Moreover, although the CSA allocates regulatory
authority both to the Attorney General and to the Secretary of Health and Human
Services, with the latter in charge of medical judgments, the interpretive rule provided
no indication of any consultation with the Secretary at all.191
Given these obvious gaps, the justification for the interpretive rule plainly did not
amount to reasoned decisionmaking in policy terms and would fail step one*. The
Attorney General’s rationale was, in essence, a legal brief, containing the types of in-
formation that courts can assess as well (or better) as anyone else.192 As the Attorney
General had not offered a reasoned policy analysis, he had no grounds for claiming
Chevron deference rooted in agency policymaking competence.
B. Making the Doctrine Better Reflect How Policy Should Inform Meaning
Another advantage of reversing the steps is that this order would better reflect how
policy concerns and statutory meaning should interrelate in close cases. As currently
framed, the Chevron two-step invites courts to deploy independently the “traditional
tools of statutory construction” to determine Congress’s “clear” intent before focusing
on agency policy analysis.193 Determining the “clear” limits imposed by Congress can
188 Dispensing of Controlled Substances to Assist Suicide, 66 Fed. Reg. at 56,608 (describing
opinion of the OLC as the “legal basis” for the interpretive rule).
189 See generally Whether Physician-Assisted Suicide Serves a “Legitimate Medical Purpose”
Under DEA Regulations, 25 Op. O.L.C. 135 (2001), available at http://www.justice.gov/olc
/2001/suicide-mem.pdf.
190 Id. at 148.
191 See Gonzales, 546 U.S. at 243, 253–54 (“On November 9, 2001, without consulting
Oregon or apparently anyone outside his Department, the Attorney General issued an Inter-
pretive Rule announcing his intent to restrict the use of controlled substances for physician-
assisted suicide.”).
192 See id. at 257 (stating that the Attorney General’s interpretive role “cannot be consid-
ered an interpretation of the regulation” because it was merely a “paraphrase [of] the statu-
tory language”).
193 Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842–43 (1984)
(instructing courts to check first whether Congress “has spoken to the precise question at issue”
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be a fuzzy exercise, however, as evidenced by five to four Supreme Court decisions
splitting on whether an agency statutory construction failed at step one.194 Given the
fuzzy nature of statutory construction, it makes sense for courts to consider how an
agency thinks its enabling act should be implemented as they determine how Congress
wanted it to be implemented.
Justice Breyer seems to have had this point strongly in mind when he authored the
lead opinion in Zuni Public School District No. 89 v. Department of Education.195 A
large federal government presence in a school district can adversely affect its tax
base.196 To address this problem, the Federal Impact Aid Program provides financial as-
sistance to adversely affected districts.197 It prevents states from making cuts that offset
this aid unless the Secretary of Education determines that the state program “equalizes
expenditures” among districts.198 This equalization inquiry requires the Secretary to
determine per-pupil expenditures in the various districts.199 As part of the process, the
Secretary is to exclude outliers, “disregard[ing] local educational agencies with per-
pupil expenditures or revenues above the 95th percentile or below the 5th percentile of
such expenditures or revenues in the State.”200
A good case can be made that the most natural (but context-free) reading of this
statutory language requires a ranking of school districts in order of per-pupil expendi-
tures followed by exclusion of ten percent of the districts (evenly split between top and
bottom).201 Under a thirty-year-old regulation, however, the Department of Education
before examining whether the “agency’s answer is based on a permissible construction”). For
an example of a court construing Chevron as forbidding reliance on agency policy views at
step one, see, e.g., Mylan Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. FDA, 454 F.3d 270, 274 (4th Cir. 2006)
(“At the first step a court focuses purely on statutory construction without according any weight
to the agency’s position.”).
194 See, e.g., Zuni Pub. Sch. Dist. No. 89 v. Dep’t of Educ., 550 U.S. 81, 82 (2007) (holding
five to four that a Department of Education regulation did not violate clear statutory language);
FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Co., 529 U.S. 120, 120 (2000) (holding five to four that
the Food and Drug Administration’s assertion of jurisdiction to regulate tobacco violated clear
congressional intent). There is something vaguely comic, or at least ironic, about five to four
splits on “clear” meaning.
195 550 U.S. 81 (2007) (Breyer, J., plurality). For another path for ensuring that agency views
inform the beginning of Chevron analysis rather than its end, see Strauss, “Deference” Is Too
Confusing, supra note 7, at 1165 (explaining that courts should apply Skidmore “weight” at
Chevron step one); Michael Herz, Judicial Review of Statutory Issues Outside of the Chevron
Doctrine, in A GUIDE TO JUDICIAL AND POLITICAL REVIEW OF FEDERAL AGENCIES 125, 142–43
(John F. Duffy & Michael Herz eds., 2005) (contending that “Skidmore should apply within
step one”).
196 Zuni, 550 U.S. at 84–85.
197 Id. at 84.
198 Id. at 85.
199 Id.
200 20 U.S.C. § 7709(b)(2)(B)(i) (2006).
201 Certainly that is what the four-Justice dissent, led by Justice Scalia, thought. Zuni, 550 U.S.
at 108 (Scalia, J., dissenting). He described the majority’s rejection of this reading as “nothing
other than the elevation of judge-supposed legislative intent over clear statutory text.” Id.
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(DOE) instead excludes the number of districts necessary to remove ten percent of the
student population from the calculations.202 For instance, suppose that a state had a stu-
dent population of one million and one hundred school districts. The richest and the
poorest districts by per-student expenditure are huge, each having 50,000 students. In
that case, the DOE’s regulation would exclude just these two districts, which include
ten percent of the student population, from its calculations. Ninety-eight percent of the
districts would remain in the count.
A person lacking any understanding of the agency’s rationale might be inclined to
reject its statutory construction. Responding to this problem, Justice Breyer’s lead opin-
ion self-consciously focused on the Secretary’s policy explanation (as well as on legis-
lative and regulatory history) for “illumination” before turning to later discussion of
the “literal language.”203 Both history and policy concerns provided strong support for
the Secretary. The implementing regulation was long-standing, a plausible case could
be made for congressional ratification, and the Secretary even had a hand in drafting the
statutory provision at issue.204 More to the present point, the policy goal underlying the
ten percent exclusion is to remove uncharacteristic outliers from calculations designed
to foster equal treatment of students.205 Due to variations in school district size across
and within states, excluding ten percent of districts from the calculation is an exception-
ally stupid and inconsistent way to accomplish this goal; excluding districts sufficient
to account for ten percent of the student population is far more sensible.206
Thus armed, Justice Breyer turned to the statute’s “literal language” and found an
escape route by distinguishing between ranking characteristics and populations.207 The
exclusions at the ninety-fifth and fifth percentile levels required creation of a distribu-
tion of some population ranked according to some criterion.208 The statute made clear
that this ranking criterion was average per student expenditures by district.209 The statute
did not, however, tell the Secretary what population to rank—e.g., the Secretary might
rank districts in order of spending, students in order of money spent upon them, etc.210
This silence, along with other contextual factors, created an ambiguity that allowed the
Secretary (sensibly) to choose to rank the students rather than districts.211 The effect of
202 Id. at 86 (majority opinion).
203 Id. at 89–90.
204 Id. at 90–91; cf. supra Part I.B (discussing pre-Chevron law extending deference to long-
standing, consistent statutory constructions).
205 Zuni, 550 U.S. at 91.
206 Justice Breyer’s characterization was more polite. See id. (“Finally, viewed in terms of
the purpose of the statute’s disregard instruction, the Secretary’s calculation method is reason-
able, while the reasonableness of a method based upon the number of districts alone (Zuni’s
proposed method) is more doubtful.”).
207 Id. at 95–96.
208 Id.
209 Id. at 96.
210 Id. at 96–97.
211 Id.
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this choice was to exclude ten percent of the student population rather than ten percent
of total districts.
Six Justices expressed alarm over Justice Breyer’s examination of the Secretary’s
policy rationale before focusing on the statutory text. Justice Scalia, writing for a four-
Justice dissent, decried “a most suspicious order of proceeding,” contravening immense
amounts of case law declaring “[w]e begin, as always, with the language of the
statute.”212 He condemned Justice Breyer’s statutory interpretation saving the regula-
tion as “sheer applesauce” that violated the plain language of the statute.213
Concurring with the lead opinion, Justice Kennedy, joined by Justice Alito, agreed
that the statutory text was ambiguous and left room for Chevron.214 The concurrence
had misgivings about how Justice Breyer reached this conclusion, however:
The opinion of the Court . . . inverts Chevron’s logical progression.
Were the inversion to become systemic, it would create the impres-
sion that agency policy concerns, rather than the traditional tools of
statutory construction, are shaping the judicial interpretation of stat-
utes. It is our obligation to set a good example; and so, in my view,
it would have been preferable, and more faithful to Chevron, to
arrange the opinion differently.215
Justice Kennedy thus squarely rejected this Article’s thesis that the ordering of the
Chevron two-step should be reversed. His stated concern was that reversing the order
would create the “impression” that courts are not giving due weight to “traditional tools
of statutory construction.”216 Perhaps, however, he was also concerned that putting
agency policy explanations at the front and center of the Chevron inquiry would give
these explanations too much weight as a matter of substance as well. This objection
does not seem persuasive, however, given that, even with the steps reversed, a court
affirming an agency pursuant to Chevron would still need to explain how the agency’s
construction squares with some reasonable understanding of the underlying statutory
language. One would think that this constraint of reasoned explanation would suffice
to keep courts and agencies within the bounds of reason, as it were.
That said, it does make sense to suppose that a judge who appreciates that an
agency has a reasoned policy justification for its statutory construction might look
harder than she otherwise would for reasons to affirm. This effect, however, is perfectly
appropriate, as Zuni illustrates. Five Justices thought the agency’s construction fell
within a zone of ambiguity;217 the four dissenting Justices thought the construction
212 Id. at 109 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
213 Id. at 113.
214 Id. at 107 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
215 Id.
216 Id.
217 Id. at 99 (majority opinion).
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violated clear statutory meaning and characterized contrary efforts as interpretive
“applesauce.”218 It is easy to imagine that this close decision might have come out the
other way at current Chevron step one if the majority had not first taken the time to
understand the policy grounds motivating the agency. This result would have been un-
fortunate, as it is difficult to see what public interest would have been served by deploy-
ing uninformed “plain language” to throw out a sensible, thirty-year-old system for
excluding statistical outliers in a program designed to equalize spending on students.
C. Diffusing Two Objections
Before closing, this Article will try to diffuse two objections that come readily to
mind to reversing the order of the Chevron two-step. The first is that this flip might re-
quire needless work from reviewing courts in cases where determining the rationality
of an agency’s policy analysis at step one* is hard but determining that the agency has
violated clear congressional intent at step two* is easy. This objection can draw weight
from the perception that judicial review of agency policy choices, especially in its “hard
look” form can be quite demanding.
A bit of flexibility can diffuse this objection, however.219 As a threshold point, there
are many cases where review for reasoned decisionmaking is straightforward and easily
accomplished—as the Chevron decision itself demonstrated.220 Also, it should not take
much time or energy for a reviewing court at least to identify the policy benefits that an
agency claims for its preferred statutory construction. Suppose, after doing so, a court
concludes that assessing the validity of the agency’s supporting reasoning would be
difficult but that the agency likely violated clear congressional intent in any event. In
such a case, the court could avoid wasting time by simply assuming for the sake of
argument that the agency’s policy justification would survive review for reasoned
decisionmaking. This approach would enable courts to dispose quickly of agency stat-
utory constructions where the agency’s policy justification, even if perfectly valid and
true, cannot disguise a plain violation of congressional intent.
The second objection involves preserving agency authority to use Chevron power
to trump some judicial precedents. One of the purported benefits of Chevron deference
is that limiting courts to rationality review allows agencies to change interpretive course
based on new learning and evolving values.221 Judicial stare decisis norms do not
218 Id. at 113 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
219 Cf. Wos v. E.M.A. ex rel. Johnson, 133 S. Ct. 1391, 1403 (2013) (Breyer, J., concurring)
(“That is to say, ‘the standard doctrines of administrative law . . . should not be taken too
rigidly.’” (quoting Louis Jaffe, Administrative Law: Burden of Proof and Scope of Review, 79
HARV. L. REV. 914, 918 (1966))).
220 See supra notes 97–102 and accompanying text (discussing the Supreme Court’s quick re-
view of the EPA’s policy justification for applying the “bubble concept” to “stationary sources”).
221 See, e.g., Smiley v. Citibank (S.D.), N. A., 517 U.S. 735, 742 (1996) (explaining that an
agency change to a statutory construction “is not invalidating, since the whole point of Chevron
is to leave the discretion provided by the ambiguities of a statute with the implementing
agency”); Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 863–64
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generally interfere because a holding that an initial agency construction is reasonable
does not necessarily contradict a later holding that a different agency construction of
the same language is also reasonable. Where Chevron deference does not apply, how-
ever, courts choose the statutory constructions they deem best.222 If a court holds that
a particular statutory construction is the best available, one might expect the usual
operation of stare decisis to block that court from later accepting a different statu-
tory construction.223
The tension between Chevron and stare decisis became acute where courts con-
strued statutory language in agency enabling acts before the relevant agencies got
around to adopting constructions eligible for Chevron deference.224 If the stare decisis
effects of the judicial constructions controlled, then agencies would lose their Chevron
power to choose among reasonable constructions. It would be passing strange, however,
for the existence of Chevron authority to depend on whether a court or an agency
adopted the first authoritative statutory construction.225
In National Cable & Telecommunications Association v. Brand X Internet Services,
the Supreme Court resolved this tension by holding that Chevron beats stare decisis.226
More specifically, an agency’s Chevron-eligible statutory construction can trump an
earlier judicial statutory construction unless the court’s opinion makes clear that its con-
struction “follow[ed] from the unambiguous terms of the statute and thus [left] no room
(1984) (“An initial agency interpretation is not instantly carved in stone. On the contrary, the
agency . . . must consider varying interpretations and the wisdom of its policy on a continu-
ing basis.”).
222 See supra Part I.A (discussing Skidmore deference).
223 See United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 247 (2001) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (stating
his view that once a court applies Skidmore to choose a statutory construction, “it becomes
unlawful for the agency to take a contradictory position; the statute now says what the court
has prescribed”).
224 See id. (contending that the Court’s Mead decision worsened this problem by expanding
the range of agency statutory constructions subject to Skidmore rather than Chevron review).
For academic discussions of this problem, see, for example, Kenneth A. Bamberger, Provisional
Precedent: Protecting Flexibility in Administrative Policymaking, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1272,
1273–76 (2002) (proposing that a court’s construction of an agency statute be regarded as
a “provisional precedent” subject to the agency’s later exercise of Chevron authority); Paul
A. Dame, Note, Stare Decisis, Chevron, and Skidmore: Do Administrative Agencies Have
the Power to Overrule Courts?, 44 WM. & MARY L. REV. 405, 435–36 (2002) (arguing that
judicial constructions of agency statutes pursuant to Skidmore should be regarded as “persua-
sive dicta” and that agencies should be able to use their Chevron authority to trump judicial
precedents). See generally Murphy, A “New” Counter-Marbury, supra note 6 (analogizing
Skidmore review to hard-look review to develop argument that earlier judicial statutory construc-
tions should not control later review of agency statutory constructions that offer new, Chevron-
eligible rationales).
225 See Mead, 533 U.S. at 247 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (castigating the majority for developing
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for agency discretion.”227 To justify allowing agencies to trump judicial statutory con-
structions, the Court turned to its trusty implicit delegation story. A Congress that wants
agencies to have Chevron authority certainly would not want its existence to depend on
accidents of timing.228 Also, depriving agencies of interpretive flexibility by binding
them with judicial constructions would “ossify” the law, which would be bad.229 Thus,
Congress must want Chevron to beat stare decisis.
If courts abandon the implicit delegation story, to avoid the silliness of Chevron
authority depending on decisional order, they would need to develop some other justi-
fication for allowing agencies to sometimes trump courts. It is not hard, with the right
will, to devise one. The stare decisis norms of the federal courts are not absolute, and
they have evolved over time.230 The Supreme Court, for instance, declares itself free to
overrule its own precedents provided it has a good enough reason.231 One accepted type
of reason for overruling a precedent is significant change in circumstances.232 Along
these lines, courts could acknowledge that a new agency construction supported by a
reasoned policy analysis provides a type of changed circumstance that justifies revisit-
ing an earlier judicial statutory construction. This stance would be in perfect keeping
with Skidmore’s insistence that courts owe respect to explanations agencies give for
their statutory constructions.
Of course, one advantage of this approach—or some variation on it—is that it is
more honest and direct than the implicit delegation story. Agencies can trump judicial
constructions of agency enabling acts because the Supreme Court thinks this power is
a good idea. It may as well say so.
CONCLUSION
Just as Professor Koch advised, judicial deference to agency decisions should track
the distinction between law and policy.233 Courts are in charge of determining the law;
227 Id. at 982.
228 Id. at 983 (“Yet whether Congress has delegated to an agency the authority to interpret
a statute does not depend on the order in which the judicial and administrative construc-
tions occur.”).
229 Id.
230 See, e.g., Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 828 (1991) (“Stare decisis is not an inexorable
command; rather, it ‘is a principle of policy and not a mechanical formula of adherence to the
latest decision.’” (quoting Helvering v. Hallock, 309 U.S. 106, 119 (1940))).
231 See, e.g., Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 443 (2000) (noting that the Court
requires a “special justification” for departing from precedent); Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa.
v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 863–64 (1992) (per curiam) (observing that overruling a precedent
requires “some special reason” beyond the judge’s view that the precedent was incorrect).
232 See, e.g., FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 556 U.S. 502, 534–35 (2009) (Thomas, J.,
concurring) (noting that “dramatic changes in factual circumstances” can support overruling
precedent); Casey, 505 U.S. at 855 (noting that a change in facts or how they are viewed can
“rob[ ] [an] old rule of significant application or justification”).
233 Koch, supra note 1, at 983–84.
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they should defer to the policymaking decisions of Congress and of agencies acting
within their spheres of authority. Chevron is best understood as applying this distinction
to the borderline problem of judicial review of an agency’s construction of a statute it
administers. Under the current ordering of the two-step, courts inquire into Congress’s
clear intent at step one and then check the agency’s justification for its choice at step
two.234 This ordering has helped make the Chevron doctrine harder and more confusing
than it needs to be. Waiting until step two to investigate the agency’s rationale obscures
that the core justification for Chevron deference should be judicial respect for agency
expertise—i.e., agencies should know their policymaking business better than the
courts. Failing to give due emphasis to this point, the Supreme Court has wasted its
energy (and that of many courts and litigants) hunting for the precise contours of
Congress’s implicit (i.e., fake) delegations of Chevron authority to agencies. Also, if
courts do in fact wait until step two to explore an agency’s rationale, they run the risk
of depriving themselves of information that may usefully illuminate statutory meaning.
An easy way to solve these problems would be to put the best justification for
Chevron deference—agency policy competence—at the front and center of the Chevron
doctrine by reversing the order of the two-step. At step one*, the reviewing court would
ask whether the agency has offered a policy justification for its choice that satisfies rea-
soned decisionmaking. By doing so, an agency demonstrates that it is basing its choice
on tools that it understands better than the court, which triggers Chevron deference with
no step zero required. If the agency has offered a reasoned policy rationale, then at step
two*, the reviewing court would check whether the agency’s construction is consistent
with a reasonable understanding of congressional policies embedded in statute. Simple,
really. Or simpler, anyway.
234 Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842–43 (1984).
